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The paper is a contribution to the current debate on linguistic data and evidence. It 
raises two questions: (a) What kinds of inconsistency do emerge in generative syntax? 
(b) How are these kinds of inconsistency to be evaluated with respect to the 
workability of the syntactic theory at issue? As a first step, a system of paraconsis-
tent logic is introduced which distinguishes between weak and strong inconsistency. 
While weak inconsistency is harmless, strong inconsistency is destructive. Second, a 
case study demonstrates that in generative syntax weak inconsistency may be a use-
ful tool of problem solving. Third, two further case studies show that intuition as a 
data source triggers the emergence of strong inconsistency in generative syntax. Fi-
nally, this results in a methodological dilemma with far-reaching consequences. 
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1 Introduction 
For a couple of decades, the data processing technique of generative 
syntax has been considered relatively unproblematic by its practitio-
ners. However, the past few years have seen a fierce debate on the 
methodological problems raised by the nature of grammaticality 
judgments as the primary data type and intuition as the primary data 
source of generative syntax.1 In the present paper, we intend to 
contribute to the debate by raising the following problem:  
 
(P) (a)  What kinds of inconsistency do emerge in generative syntax? 
(b)  How are these kinds of inconsistency to be evaluated with 
respect to the workability of the syntactic theory at issue? 
 
In order to highlight the relevance of (P), we refer to three aspects of 
the state of the art in the philosophy of science. The first is the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction as advocated in classical two-valued logic. It 
says that no statement can be both true and false at the same time. In 
contradictory systems of statements any statement can be inferred 
and therefore the system results in logical chaos.  
Second, the Analytical Philosophy of Science which had dominated 
the methodology of scientific research until the impact of Kuhn's 
(1970)[1962] seminal work, presupposes the principle of non-contra-
diction as the most important pillar of the methodology of the natural 
sciences. Nevertheless, the epistemological consequences of the viola-
tion of the principle of non-contradiction would be disastrous for sci-
entific knowledge:  
For it can easily be shown that if one were to accept contradictions, then one 
would have to give up any kind of scientific activity: it would mean a complete 
breakdown of science. This can be shown by proving that if two contradictory 
statements are admitted, any statement whatever must be admitted; for from 
a couple of contradictory statements any statement whatever can be validly 
inferred. (Popper 1962: 313; emphasis added) 
 
                                                
1  See e.g. Schütze (1996), Borsley (ed.)(2005), Penke & Rosenbach (eds.) (2007), Kepser 
& Reis (eds.)(2005), Sternefeld (ed.)(2007), Featherston & Winkler (eds.)(2009), 
Winkler & Featherston (eds.)(2009) etc. For a detailed analysis of the debate see 
Kertész & Rákosi (2012). 
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Consequently, a scientific theory which includes a contradiction 
may make arbitrary claims about the world and should therefore be 
deemed irrational.  
Nevertheless, there is a third aspect as well which may overrule 
the destructive consequences of these views. Namely, as we know, the 
Analytical Philosophy of Science no longer prevails. During the cur-
rent renewal of the philosophy of science, it has been also realised 
that the emergence of a contradiction in a scientific theory is not nec-
essarily destructive. Current philosophy of science has re-evaluated 
the structure and function of contradictions in scientific inquiry as 
follows (see e.g. the contributions in Meheus 2002):  
(i) There may be different kinds of contradiction and contradictions 
may play different roles in scientific theorising. Therefore, their 
evaluation should depend on their particular properties: 
Researchers rarely reject a promising approach on the ground that it is appar-
ently inconsistent. Conversely, inconsistency does not necessarily kill all 
promise of problem-solving success. Not all inconsistencies are equal. Some are 
profound while others are mere nuisances, rough spots to tiptoe around. 
(Nickles 2002: 20f.; emphasis added) 
Accordingly, there may be contradictions which are not disastrous 
that is which do not lead to the collapse of the theory at issue. 
(ii) There have been logics elaborated which facilitate the tolerance 
of certain kinds of contradiction, while at the same time, they are ca-
pable of avoiding logical chaos: 
[…] we are left with the task of better understanding how inconsistency and 
neighboring kinds of incompatibility are tamed in scientific practice and the 
corresponding task of better modeling idealised practice in the form of incon-
sistency-tolerant logics and methodologies. (Nickles 2002: 2; emphasis added) 
Such logics are called paraconsistent. Accordingly, they seem to pro-
vide tools for the reconstruction of certain contradictions emerging in 
scientific inquiry. Paraconsistent logics may account for cases in 
which the contradiction between the data and the hypotheses does not 
make the theory at issue unworkable. 
Against the background sketched, we will proceed as follows. In 
Section 2, we will introduce a particular approach to paraconsistent 
logic which we expect to be able to differentiate between weak and 
strong inconsistency. Section 3 will be devoted to a case study which 
exemplifies the emergence of weak inconsistency in generative syn-
tax. In Section 4 we will discuss two case studies aiming at the ex-
 András Kertész 160 
emplification of strong inconsistency. Finally, in Section 5, we will 
draw the conclusions from the case studies which yield the solution to 
our problem (P).  
2 Rescher and Brandom's paraconsistent logic 
The logical consequence relation of classical two-valued logic is said to 
be explosive which means that from a contradictory pair of premises 
any statement can be inferred. In contrast, a logical consequence 
relation is paraconsistent if and only if it is not explosive, and a logic 
is called paraconsistent if and only if its logical consequence relation 
is not explosive. Accordingly, a paraconsistent logic allows for specific 
kinds of inconsistency without triggering logical chaos. However, in 
order to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to distinguish 
paraconsistency from dialetheism. While paraconsistency merely 
maintains that inconsistency does not lead to triviality i.e. to the pos-
sibility of inferring any arbitrary statement, dialetheism claims that 
there are true contradictions.2  
Thus, the central question which paraconsistent logics are intended 
to answer is how logical chaos can be avoided even if the system at 
issue includes contradictory statements. Different paraconsistent 
logics give different answers to this question by elaborating different 
technical tools. We will suggest the application of a paraconsistent 
                                                
2  "Paraconsistency […] is to do with the inference relation {A, ¬A} ⊨  B for every A 
and B (ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ)). Dialetheism, on the other hand, is the 
view that there are true contradictions. If dialetheism is to be taken as a view 
that does not entail everything, then a dialetheist's preferred logic must better be 
paraconsistent. For dialetheism is the view that some contradiction is true and it 
does not amount to trivialism which is the view that everything, including every 
contradiction, is true.  
Now, a paraconsistent logician may feel the force of pulling them towards 
dialetheism. Yet the view that a consequence relation should be paraconsistent 
does not entail the view that there are true contradictions. Paraconsistency is a 
property of an inference relation whereas dialetheism is a view about some 
sentences (or propositions, statements, utterances or whatever, that can be 
thought of as truth-bearers). The fact that one can define a non-explosive conse-
quence relation does not mean that some sentences are true. That is, the fact that 
one can construct a model where a contradiction holds but not every sentence of 
the language holds (or, if the model theory is given intensionally, where this is the 
case at some world) does not mean that the contradiction is true per se. Hence 
paraconsistency must be distinguished from dialetheism." (Priest & Tanaka 2009) 
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logic to (P), which does not amount to dialetheism i. e. does not claim 
that the contradictions that obtain in the system of statements are 
true. We choose Rescher & Brandom (1980).3  
Rescher and Brandom's 'logic of inconsistency' is based on a 
Kripke-semantics. However, the authors introduce two modifications. 
First, they define the operation of superposition on the set of possible 
worlds as follows:  
 
(1) The superposition of the possible world w1 and w2 is a possible 
world w in which a statement p is true if and only if it is true 
either in w1 or in w2.  
 
' ' symbolises the operation of superposition and w1  w2 = w the 
relation between the two component worlds and the superposed 
world. Then, (1) says that p is true in w1  w2 if and only if it is true at 
least in one of the component worlds.  
The consequence of (1) is that it may be the case that in w both p 
and ~p are true – however, separately in the two different component-
worlds of w. p & ~p is not true in w because it is neither true in w1, 
nor in w2.4  
Second, the valid inference principle of classical logic maintains:  
 
(2)  p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q 
 
(2) can be assigned two different semantic interpretations:  
 
(3) If 
(a) p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q is a valid inference principle of classical 
logic, and 
(b) p1 is true in w, p2 is true in w, ..., pn is true in w,  
then 
(c)  q is true in w. 
 
                                                
3  See Kertész (2004), (2011) for further applications of Rescher & Brandom (1980) 
to linguistics. 
4  '&' stands for the logical constant 'conjunction' and '~' for 'negation'. 
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(4) If 
(a) p1, p2, ..., pn ├ q is a valid inference principle of classical 
logic, and 
(b) p1 & p2 & ... & pn is true in w,  
then 
(c) q is true in w. 
 
(3) is the distributive and (4) the conjunctive reading of the valid in-
ference principle. If one accepts (3), then logical chaos cannot be ex-
cluded, because p and ~p may appear as premises in an inference. In 
contrast, (4) does not permit inferences from contradictory premises, 
because statements contradicting each other cannot be conjunctively 
true. Accordingly, Rescher and Brandom accept (4) as the semantic 
interpretation of the valid inference principle of classical logic. (1) and 
(4) legitimise the introduction of two notions of inconsistency.  
We will speak of weak inconsistency if, first, in a possible world w 
such that w1  w2 = w, both p and ~p are true; thereby, p is true in w1 
and ~p is true in w2 or vice versa. In this case the contradictory 
statements obtain in two distinct possible worlds. Second, logical 
chaos cannot emerge because the simultaneous use of p and ~p as the 
premises of inferences is forbidden. 
Strong inconsistency emerges if these two conditions do not hold. 
Rescher and Brandom's paraconsistent system allows weak, but ex-
cludes strong inconsistency.  
Against this background, we will assume that the paraconsistent 
logic which accepts (1) and (4) can be expected to provide a possible 
solution to our problem (P) insofar as it differentiates between strong 
and weak inconsistency. Thereby, weak inconsistency is to be evalu-
ated as harmless, because it does not lead to the collapse of the sys-
tem, whereas strong inconsistency is harmful. 
  As the next step of our argumentation, we will analyse three case 
studies taken from generative grammar. We will apply the paracon-
sistent logic introduced above in order to decide whether they are 
weakly or strongly inconsistent.5  
                                                
5  From this point on we will use the term 'contradiction' without an attribute in the 
sense 'either strong or weak contradiction' in order to refer to cases in which it 
has not yet been decided whether the relation between two statements rests on 
strong or weak contradiction.  
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3 Case study: weak inconsistency in generative syntax 
As an example we choose Katalin É. Kiss' (1987: 224-243) govern-
ment-binding approach to subject control constructions in Hungarian. 
We will discuss them by adapting Moravcsik's (2006: 57-59) very clear 
summary of É. Kiss' considerations, and we will also cite Moravcsik's 
examples. 
Let us consider the following sentence (É. Kiss 1987: 237): 
 
(5) (Én)  szeretné-lek ritkán látni (téged)  itt. 
(I) would:like-S1:S2.OBJ seldom see-INF(youS:ACC) here 
'I would like to see you here seldom.' 
 
Here the main verb (szeretnélek) agrees both with its subject (én) and 
the direct object (téged) of the infinitive (látni) and the subject.6 The 
problem is that, on the one hand, it is generally assumed that verb 
agreement is local i.e. the controller and the target are in the same 
clause. On the other hand, in (1) the agreement controller and the 
target seem to be in two different clauses. Therefore, the following 
contradictory pair of claims is obtained:  
 
(6) (a) Subject control constructions in Hungarian are bi-clausal. 
 (b) Subject control constructions in Hungarian are mono-clausal. 
 
The problem is that, according to É. Kiss, the data support both the 
mono-clausal and the bi-clausal analysis.  
 
I.  Arguments for (6)(a) 
 Argument 1. The first argument for bi-clausality may be illus-
trated by the following sentences:7 
 
(7) (a) Én  egy  film-et  akar-ok  néz-ni. 
  I a  film-ACC want-S1:INDEF.OBJ watch-INF 
  'I want to watch a film' 
 
  
                                                
6  Since Hungarian is a pro-drop language, the subject pronoun may be dropped.  
7  According to Moravcsik's notation in the glosses 'S1' is to be read as 'singular first 
person subject'. The first component of the glosses of the verb suffix indicates the 
subject and the second indicates the object. 
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(b) Igyeksz-ek majd egy hozzáértőt    megkérdez-ni 
 try-S1.INDEF.OBJ later an expert:ACC  ask-INF 
 'I will try to ask an expert.' 
 
But: *Igyekez-ek egy  hozzáértőt 
 try-S1.INDEF.OBJ an expert:ACC 
 
In (7)(a) there is a noun phrase marked for the accusative and there 
are two verbs. The main verb akar ('want') is transitive and thus it 
may govern the accusative case. But in (7)(b) the main verb igyekszik 
(to try') is intransitive, and that's why it cannot be responsible for the 
accusative of its own object. As opposed to this, the infinitive meg-
kérdez ('to ask') is obligatorily transitive and takes a direct object. 
Consequently, the object noun phrase is the object of the subordinate 
verb. Thus, the sentence includes two clauses. The main verb is the 
head of one of the clauses, whereas the infinitive is the head of the 
other.  
Argument 2. There is a rule according to which in Hungarian the 
focused constituent must directly precede the verb of the clause in 
which it appears. Now, consider (8): 
 
(8) Igyekezlek TÉGED hívni  fel  holnap először. 
 try:S1:S2OBJ yous:ACC to:call up tomorrow first. 
 'It is yous that I will try to call tomorrow first.' 
 
Here it is the direct object téged (yous:ACC) that is in focus position 
while it is followed by the infinitive. Therefore, it must be the object of 
the infinitive. 
 
II. Arguments for (6)(b) 
 Argument 3. Consider (5): 
 
(9) TÉGED  igyekezlek felhívni holnap  először. 
 yous:ACC try:S1:S2.OBJ to:call:up tomorrow first. 
 'I will try to call yous tomorrow.' 
 
(9) witnesses that the object may appear in focus position in such a 
way that it immediately precedes the infinitive. Accordingly, it is the 
object of the main verb and therefore the sentence permits a mono-
clausal analysis.  
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 Argument 4. A further argument for mono-clausality says that, 
since clauses have inflected verbs, it is unmotivated to assume that 
the infinitive occurs in an independent clause. 
 Argument 5. Moreover, the main verb agrees with the object. Ac-
cordingly, we can assume that the object belongs to the main verb and 
this is an argument for the mono-clausal analysis. 
At this point, if we compare the two sets of arguments, then we 
will immediately see that there are three of contradictions. Argu-
ments 1 and 2 contradict the hypothesis (6)(b). Arguments 3-5 contra-
dict the hypothesis (6)(a). Finally, (6)(a) and (6)(b) contradict each 
other, too.  
In order to save the consistency of the theory, one option would be 
to discard either (6)(a) or (6)(b). However, this would lead to the loss 
of relevant information, because the data in favour of the hypothesis 
to be rejected would be discarded, too. Another option would be to 
reject the whole theory, in the spirit of the Analytical Philosophy of 
Science as we quoted in the Introducton. Yet É. Kiss chose neither of 
these options:  
It appears that the monoclausal and biclausal properties of subject control 
constructions are equally weighty; neither of them can be ignored or explained 
away. What is more, they are simultaneously present; consequently, the bi-
clausal structure and monoclausal structure that can be associated with a 
subject control construction cannot represent two subsequent stages of the 
derivation, but must hold simultaneously. (É. Kiss 1987: 237) 
As the quotation witnesses, the author advocates the simultaneous 
presence of the two contradictory statements and she highlights the 
necessity of keeping both of them.  
Then, the next question for us is whether here we have to deal 
with strong or weak inconsistency. In order to decide this question, let 
us consider the following: 
If […] the infinitive and the constituent incorporated into it are retrieved from 
the lexicon as a single constituent, movement rules can analyze the subject 
control construction either as a monoclausal or as a biclausal structure – but 
they cannot analyze it in both ways. (É. Kiss 1987: 242; emphasis added). 
This quotation nicely illustrates the very essence of superposition: 
namely, that the contradicting statements may coexist, but that they 
coexist separately and do not serve as joint premises of inferences. 
This means, in our terminology, that the mono-clausal and the bi-
clausal treatment do not hold in the same possible world, but rather, 
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they hold in two different constituent possible worlds. Accordingly, É. 
Kiss' approach is weakly inconsistent. This is the reason why her 
theory does not collapse and does not lead to logical chaos; it is a per-
fect example of paraconsistency in generative syntax.  
Accordingly, É. Kiss (1987: 238) maintains that "it appears prob-
able that subject control constructions […] have to be assigned a dual 
structure". Figure 1 is the adaptation of É. Kiss' (1987: 238) figure 
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Now we can reconstruct the paraconsistency of É. Kiss' analysis as 
follows:  
 
(10) (a) Let the following statements be given:  
P = Subject control constructions in Hungarian are bi-
clausal.  
Q = Subject control constructions in Hungarian are mono-
clausal. 
(b) Let us assume that w1  w2 = w, where w is the whole of É. 
Kiss' theory. 
(c) Let the possible world w1 include arguments 1 and 2. Let 
the possible world w2 include the arguments 3, 4 and 5.  
(d) Then, P is true in w1 but false in w2 and Q is true in w2 but 
false in w1. Consequently, in w both P and Q are true, but P 
& Q is true neither in w1 nor in w2 nor in w. 
 
However simple this reconstruction of É. Kiss' approach to subject 
control constructions in Hungarian is, it has far-reaching conse-
quences as regards the handling of inconsistency in linguistic theo-
rising.  
The first is that the inconsistency is static, because no attempt at 
its resolution has been made at that stage of theory formation at 
which É. Kiss' analysis is located.8 In spite of this it can be tolerated 
and does not undermine the informativeness of the theory. 
Second, (10) yields a straightforward explanation for the double-
facedness of the theory. On the one hand, the theory is well working. 
The reason for this is that it did not discard classical logic insofar as 
it did not give up the principle of non-contradiction and does not allow 
for drawing inferences from contradictory premises. In spite of its 
weak inconsistency, the theory preserves its informativeness. On the 
other hand, our reconstruction has accounted for the simultaneous 
maintenance of the two contradictory statements (6)(a) and (b).  
Third, the logical model itself, which we applied to É. Kiss' analy-
sis, is consistent, because, as we have seen, it presupposes (1) and (4). 
                                                
8  It is a crucial problem that in the process of theory formation there is a dynamism 
between the emergence and the resolution of contradictions. For example, the 
resolution of a particular contradiction ma give rise to another at another point of 
the theory. Here we cannot deal with this issue. We merely remark that Kertész 
& Rákosi (2006), (2012) argue that this kind of dynamism can be captured by a 
model of plausible argumentation which is closely related to paraconsistency.  
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The significance of these findings is that the paraconsistent solu-
tion of problems seems to facilitate the explanation of structures 
which, without the tolerance of paraconsistency, would fall outside 
the scope of the syntactic theory at issue.  
4 Case studies: strong inconsistency in syntactic 
theorising 
4.1 Introductory remark 
As mentioned in the Introduction, during the past decade the reli-
ability of grammaticality judgments as the primary data type and in-
tuition as the primary data source of syntactic theorising has been a 
fiercely debated issue.9 In the present section, we will discuss two 
examples both of which belong to the context of this debate on lin-
guistic data. The first will show that strong inconsistency may emerge 
if there is a clash between two different data sources, namely, 
intuition and experiment. The second traces back strong inconsis-
tency to a certain kind of interference within grammaticality judg-
ments.  
4.1 The linguist's grammaticality judgements vs. the 
results of experiments 
Featherston (2007: 273ff.) exemplifies the basic problem which arises 
from the general practice according to which hypotheses are sup-
ported by the linguist's own grammaticality judgments which consti-
tute his/her only data base. Here we will reconstruct one of 
Featherston's examples with the help of Rescher and Brandom's logic 
in order to show that such cases may lead to inconsistency.  
 Featherston quotes Grewendorf (1988:5 8) where the following 
grammaticality judgments are considered as data:  
 
                                                
9  See Kertész & Rákosi (2012) for detailed analyses of the current debate on 
linguistic data. 
Inconsistency and the dilemma of intuitionistic research in generative syntax  169 
(11) (a) Der Arzt  zeigte den Patientenj sichj/*ihnj im Spiegel. 
The doctor  showed the patient:ACC himself/him in the mirror. 
  (b) Der Arzt  zeigte dem Patientenj  ihnj/*sichj im Spiegel 
  The doctor  showed the patient:DAT him/himself  in the mirror 
 
In Grewendorf's view these data support the following hypothesis: 
 
(12) "Ist das Antezedens ein Akkusativ-Objekt, dann wird ein korefe-
rentes Dativ-Objekt reflexiviert. Ist das Antezedens jedoch ein 
Dativ-Objekt, dann wird ein koreferentes Akkustiv-Objekt nicht 
reflexiviert (sondern pronominalisiert)." Grewendorf (1988: 58) 
  
Featherston compiled a questionnaire including 16 syntactic and 8 
lexical variants, and collected the introspective grammaticality judg-
ments of 26 informants. He reports on the details of the experiment 
which we do not repeat here, because for our purposes it will be suffi-
cient to mention only the main finding:  
 
(13) According to the experimental data, the reflexive is better than 
the pronoun irrespective of whether the antecedent was dative 
or accusative.  
 
Thus, for the sake of argument, let us formulate this finding as the 
exact opposite of (12) 
 
(14) (12) is not the case.  
 
Featherston (2007: 275) concludes that "the judgments of an individ-
ual are revealed to be inadequate as a basis for theory development" 
and emphasises that finer data are required such as the experimental 
data mentioned.  
 From the point of view of our problem (P), it is important to re-
mark that, similarly to the case discussed in Section 3, there are 
three contradictions here: one between the data in (11) and the hy-
pothesis in (14); another between the data referred to in (13) and the 
hypothesis in (12); and finally, between (12) and (14).  
 Should the contradiction between (12) and (14) be reconstructed as 
weak or strong inconsistency? The crucial point is that both Grewen-
dorf's grammaticality judgments in (11) on which (12) is based and 
the experimentees' judgments referred to in (13) yielding (14) are 
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rooted in the same data source, namely, introspection. Accordingly, it 
is not the case that they obtain under different conditions. Therefore, 
it is not possible to divide the possible world corresponding to 
Grewendorf's theory into two component worlds, one including 
Grewendorf's judgment, the other those of the experimentees. Since 
both kinds of judgments work as premises yielding (12) and (14), 
respectively, there is no avoiding the latter's conjunction which 
inevitably results in strong inconsistency.  
We reconstruct this situation as follows: 
 
(15) (a) Let the following statements be given: 
P = the data in (11). 
Q = the data referred to in (13). 
R = (12) 
S = (14)  
(b) Let the possible world w be the whole theory. 
(c) In w both P and Q are true. 
(d) In the possible world w, R is true, because it is a conse-
quence of P. Similarly, in the possible world w, S is true, 
because it is a consequence of Q. 
(e) Therefore, w is strongly inconsistent.  
4.2 Interference in grammaticality judgments 
Riemer (2009: 615) assumes that  
[i]ntuitions are problematic as sources of data since they are notoriously sus-
ceptible to 'noise' created by extragrammatical factors. In particular, linguistic 
intuitions of grammaticality are hard to distinguish from stylistic intuitions of 
correctness or felicity. These notions derive from an age-old prescriptive 
grammatical and pedagogic tradition and reflect many extrinsic considera-
tions, in particular notions of elegance, good style and 'logical' or felicitous ex-
pression. 
As an example, he refers to the following sentence discussed among 
others in (Hornstein et al. 2005: 299):  
 
(16) *There seems to be many people in the room.  
 
Riemer claims that on the one hand, the reason why this sentence is 
judged ungrammatical is that the judgment interferes with tradi-
tional Latin prescriptive grammars in which verb/subject concord is 
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more prominent than in English. On the other hand, he refers to a 
great number of data representing the construction 'there-seems-to-be 
+ plural NP'. Thus, the judgment is in opposition to (16):  
 
(17) There seems to be many people in the room. 
 
He concludes that such phrases may witness the existence of a differ-
ent construction with separate syntactic properties:  
We can adduce language-internal reasons (English verb–'subject' concord) for 
which the construction might be counted as ungrammatical, justifying the 
feeling of unacceptability which it provokes in some subjects. But the very as-
sumption that the concord rule applies to there is sentences in English is open 
to question. We should not assume that phrases like [12] necessarily observe 
the standard concord regime: they may already constitute a distinct construc-
tion with an autonomous syntax. This hypothesis would explain the intuitions 
of those speakers for whom [12] is acceptable. Given that we also suspect that 
for some speakers at least the judgement of ungrammaticality is influenced by 
prescriptive considerations, it is very unclear how to proceed: which in-
tuition is relevant for theory construction, and how can we untangle it 
from prejudices, perhaps deeply held, about correct or proper speech? (Riemer 
2009: 615; bold emphasis added) 
This boils down to the fact that there are two contradicting hypothe-
ses:  
 
(18) In English Verb-subject concord applies to the construction 
'there-seems-to-be + plural NP' 
 
(19) In English Verb-subject concord does not apply to the construc-
tion 'there-seems-to-be + plural NP'. 
 
In analogy to the example discussed in the previous subsection, here 
we find three contradictions again: two between data and hypotheses, 
and one between two hypotheses. From the point of view of inconsis-
tency, here again the problem is that a clear separation of (18) and 
(19) by associating them with two different component possible worlds 
of a superposed possible world is not possible:  
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(20) (a) Let the following statements be given: 
P = the data in (16). 
Q = the data in (17). 
R = (18) 
S = (19)  
(b) Let the possible world w be the whole theory. 
(c) In w both P and Q are true. 
(d) In the possible world w, R is true, because it is a conse-
quence of P. Similarly, in the possible world w, S is true, 
because it is a consequence of Q. 
(e) Therefore, w is strongly inconsistent. 
5 Conclusion: inconsistency and the dilemma of 
intuitionistic research in generative syntax 
So far, our line of reasoning seems to have given a straightforward 
solution to our problem (P)(a): in generative syntax both weak and 
strong inconsistency are present.  
 The comparison of the case study in Section 3 with those in Section 
4 will yield our solution to (P)(b). In the first case study it was not 
grammaticality judgments that were the source of the contradiction. 
The contradiction was rooted in two sets of arguments in favour of the 
two hypotheses as a result of which the two hypotheses were vali-
dated under two distinct sets of conditions. The grammaticality judg-
ments of the Hungarian sentences in É. Kiss' argumentation were 
consistent.  
As opposed to this, in the case studies in Section 4 it was the 
grammaticality of the same sentence that was judged contradictorily. 
Moreover, both of the contradicting statements stemmed from the 
same data source, namely, intuition. Consequently, it is this data type 
and this source that seems to be responsible for the fact that the 
analyses were strongly contradictory.  
One way to avoid strong inconsistency would be to split up the 
contradictory grammaticality judgments into two distinct consistent 
subsets which correspond to two distinct possible worlds and to con-
struct their superposition representing the whole theory at issue. 
However, although this technique is formally always possible, in syn-
tactic theorising it would lead to absurd consequences. Namely, both 
case studies in the previous section show that in the extreme case 
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there may be a set of data that is based merely on the intuition of a 
single individual (e.g. Grewendorf) or at least a very small group of 
individuals (Hornstein et al.). Considering for example Grewendorf's 
data as belonging to one of the possible worlds and those of the ex-
perimentees as belonging to the other, would lead to the absurd con-
sequence that, based on Grewendorf's very specific data, specific hy-
potheses have to be constructed, and, based on the latter, a specific 
grammar of an individual. Likewise, the paraconsistent resolution of 
the inconsistency in the third case study would mean to construct a 
specific grammar of a very small group of individuals like Hornstein 
and his co-authors. Accordingly, the intuitionistic methodology of 
generative syntax faces a dilemma: as long as the data type to be 
considered is grammaticality judgments and the data source is the 
intuition of native speakers, the theory may result either in strong 
inconsistency or in absurdity. Neither of these options is an attractive 
perspective.10  
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